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[Vol. 68

scientific authorities which he recognized as standard on the
subject matter involved in order to test his knowledge and accuracy.
A few courts have adopted the liberal view which permits
authoritative treatises to be used on the cross-examination of expert
witnesses even though the expert does not recognize the authoritative status of the work and has not relied on treatises in his testimony. The modern tendency veers toward freedom of crossexamination of expert witnesses, but it is doubtful if many courts
will become this liberal. However, in Bluebird Baking Co. v.
McCarthy, 19 Ohio L. Abs. 466, 3 Ohio Op. 490, 36 N.E.2d 801
(Ct. App. 1935), there is a dictum that Ohio would permit the
cross-examination of experts with publications of writers of recognized skill and ability. The leading exponent of this liberal rule is
the Uniform Rules of Evidence. These rules would eliminate all
prohibitions upon the use of a treatise for purposes of cross-examination except those that would apply to the use of testimony by
another expert witness for the same purpose. Ulmuom Ruixs oF
EviD&.cx rule 61(31), comment (1953).
A diligent research has revealed no West Virginia cases on this
subject. One may ponder whether West Virginia will move to a
liberal view on the use of treatises in the cross-examination of
expert witnesses or adhere to the more conservative view requiring
the reliance of the expert upon or recognition by the expert of
learned treatises used in the cross-examination.
Menis Elbert Ketchum, 11

Federal Courts-Another Chapter To Erie
P averred that he was injured in the state of New York on
August 18, 1961, while using road building equipment manufactured
by D-1 and bought from D-2. He filed complaints in federal court
against D-1 on August 20, 1962, and against D-2 on February 13,
1964. Proper service of process on D-2 was not made until October
22, 1964. The basis of federal jurisdiction was diversity of citizenship. In a motion for judgment on the pleadings, D-2 contended
that the action was barred by the New York statute of limitations
in that such actions must be commenced within three years. The
law of New York is that such actions are commenced by service
of process, but an action is commenced in federal courts merely by
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filing a complaint. Held, motion denied. The federal rules are
supreme when squarely in conflict with state law. Sylvestri v.
Warner & Swasey Co., 244 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
Since the establishment of the Erie doctrine, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), requiring federal courts to apply state
law in diversity actions, the discrepancies in the provisions of the
federal rules of civil procedure and corresponding state law have
given rise to numerous difficult questions. The popularity of the
Erie doctrine reached a zenith in the late 1940's, but more recent
decisions have tended to emphasize the primacy of the federal
rules over contrary local policy. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460
(1965). Although a 1948 decision of the United States Supreme
Court is contrary to the district court decision in the instant case,
Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530
(1949), the decision here follows the trend of recent decisions.
The famous case of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842),
held that the Rules of Decision Act 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1958), which
stated that the laws of the states shall be regarded as rules of
decision in the courts of the United States, extended only to the
positive statutes of the states. Then Erie was decided, holding
that the Rules of Decision Act requires federal courts in diversity
cases to follow a state's judicial interpretation of its law. The
Court in Erie also held that federal courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.
The position of the Court was substantually redefined in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), in which the Court
articulated the "outcome determinative" test. In essence, the York
decision required the result of the litigation to be the same, whether
brought in a state or federal court within the forum state. The
Erie-York doctrine would require federal courts to apply a state
rule of procedure if the result would be different depending upon
whether the state or federal rule was applied.
The leading case in which a federal rule was subordinated to a
conflicting state requirement is Ragan v. Merchants Transfer &
Warehouse Co., supra. Rule three of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that an action is commenced by filing a complaint. However, by the state statute the complaint had to be
filed and served before the statute of limitations was tolled. The
Supreme Court held that filing is insufficient to toll the statute
of limitations in a diversity case if the state rule requires service.
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In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525 (1958),
the Supreme Court first retreated from the "outcome determinative"
formula of Erie-York. In Byrd the Court suggested that if a state
rule merely affected the "form and mode" of enforcement of a
state created right, there might be certain countervailing considerations which would compel a federal court to follow federal procedure even though the outcome of the litigation would be technically affected. The Court held that a state rule must be applied
if it is an "integral part" of a state created right; otherwise a
balancing of state and federal interests should determine which
law controls. The advantage of the Byrd approach is that it does
not force a federal court to follow state rules merely to achieve
conformity of outcome in all cases.
Similarily, in Hanna v. Plumer, supra, the Court moved closer
toward the goal of uniformity of federal procedure by holding that
the service of process requirements of Federal rule four were not
displaced by more stringent state standards. Thus service on the
defendant, an executor, did not have to be by the "in hand" method
set forth in the state statute. As stated by the Court, the purpose
of the Erie doctrine, even as redefined in York and Ragan, was
never to limit the federal courts to an "outcome determinative"
test when there are affirmative countervailing (federal) considerations and when there is a congressional mandate (the rules) supported by constitutional authority. Hanna and Byrd limit the use
of the "outcome determinative" test and appear to give strong support to the policies underlying the countervailing considerations
concept. As a result, strong countervailing federal considerations
supporting uniformity of procedure and speedy adjudication upon
the merits suggest application of federal procedural law.
Instances where the courts have declared a strong federal policy
to exist have not been limited to questions of federal procedure.
Other areas in which the concept has been applied include judge
or jury determination of a particular issue, Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec.
Co-op., supra, and whether the public policy of a state prohibiting
a declaratory judgment in certain instances or the policy expressed
by Congress in the Declaratory Judgment Act should prevail.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Charneski, 286 F.2d 238 (7th Cir. 1960).
It seems significant that the Court in Hanna did not expressly
repudiate the decision in Erie, as redefined in York and Ragan.
By contrast, in Hanna the Court held that federal rule four was
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controlling when in direct conflict with state law. However, in
Ragan the Court held that the local state policy was controlling
when in conflict with federal rule three. In the principal case,
the district court upheld the spirit of the Hanna decision, declaring
that federal rule three is controlling when in conflict with state law.
Although the decision in the principal case supplements Hanna
and seems to be moving toward the establishment of uniformity
in the federal courts in matters of procedure, the picture is still
very cloudy. Since Hanna did not expressly overrule the decision
in Ragan, all one can do is speculate what future decisions of the
Supreme Court will be in this area. Until a final determination of
this question, the prudent attorney will protect his client by
meeting the requirements of both the federal and state rule.
William Jack Stevens

Federal Courts-Prosecution of Officers under the Civil Rights Acts
D's, a county attorney and his deputy, filed and prosecuted a
complaint charging F, a sixteen year old girl, with first degree
murder. Following her arrest, P alleged that she was confined to
a drunk tank for twenty-five days without a preliminary hearing.
Moreover, P claimed she was taken outside the county in furtherance of an unsuccessful attempt to obtain her confession. P also
was allegedly taken to the scene of the crime where attempts
were made to intimidate her into confessing. Upon being released,
P filed a complaint charging that Ds, while acting under color of
state law, exceeded their jurisdiction and deprived her of rights
secured by the federal constitution. The United States District
Court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The federal
appellate court ruled that the real issue was whether P had stated
a claim upon which relief could be granted. Held, reversed. The
complaint did state a cause of action. Ds, as prosecuting attorneys,
are entitled to a limited immunity because of their quasi-judicial
roles. However, if a prosecuting attorney commits acts which are
related to police activity as opposed to judicial activity, the cloak
of immunity no longer protects him. Here, if Ds alleged acts
were in the nature of police acts, they clearly were beyond the
scope of judicial immunity. Rxv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1958) grants federal courts the jurisdiction to hear cases
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